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NAVIGATING THE WATERS OF
MASSACHUSETTS CHILD RELOCATION LAW:
ASSESSING THE APPLICATION OF THE REAL
ADVANTAGE STANDARD
Tom and Caroldivorcedfive years ago after ten years of marriage.
As stipulated in the separation agreement, Tom and Carol would enjoy legal custody of their three minor children. Carol would have sole physical
custody over the three girls. After years of unhappinessfollowing her divorce, Carol starts dating and meets Mike. They date for a year, and get
married Mike lives in Rhode Island with three children of his own. Carol
wishes to relocatefrom Massachusetts to Rhode Island with her three children to be with her new spouse. Tom objects to the move. Carol seeks
permissionfrom the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court to relocate
the minor children to Rhode Island to be with her new spouse.
I. INTRODUCTION
The dilemma facing Tom and Carol is not uncommon when a custodial parent wants to relocate to be with a new spouse, take a new job, or
move near family and friends. When two parents divorce or choose not to
marry after having a child, the demise of the relationship between the parents bears obvious consequences and restrictions on the lives of both parents and, most importantly, the child. In an increasingly mobile society
where about one-fifth of all Americans change their residence every year, a
consequence of divorce is the challenge that a custodial parent faces when
he/she seeks to relocate or move out of the state with the child.'
Litigation over child relocation disputes has increased for many
reasons, including the increased mobility of today's society, the reality that
parents change jobs regularly, the increase in women in the work force, and
the likelihood of divorces and remarriages.2 As a result, a reality of the

I See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 480 (Cal. 1996) (citing statistic); Hon. Connie
Peterson, Relocation of Children by the Custodial Parent, 65 AM. JUR. TRIALS 127 (2006) (citing
statistic); see also Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 222 (N.J. 2001) (discussing statistic that
twenty-five percent of custodial parents move within four years of divorce or separation).
2 See Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? Examining the Consequences ql Post-Dissolution
Parenting,41 FAM. L.Q. 105, 118 (2007) (discussing causes of"move away" cases). Causes include geographic mobility increased by economic and technological developments, the fact that
many workers change jobs, and also the notion that different parts of the country experience job
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modem divorced family is the possibility that a custodial parent may seek
to relocate out of state with the minor child. Relocation cases are often the
most difficult cases facing family law judges.4 In an attempt to resolve the
challenge created by one parent's seemingly simple desire to move, family
courts in every state face the daunting task of weighing the interests of the
child, custodial parent, and non-custodial parent to determine if a move is
within the best interests of the child.5

growth. Id.; see also Lance Cagle, Have Kids, Might Travel: The Need for a New Roadmap in
Illinois Relocation Cases, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255, 256 (2005) (noting growing divorce rate and
mobility of society as reasons why relocation litigation is an important topic in family court);
Cynthia Coulter George, Post-Divorce Relocation Becomes Hot Topic in Connecticut Family
Law, http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Nov/1/127161.html (last visited April 6, 2008) (discussing
reasons for influx in relocation cases). "The increasing number of relocation cases being litigated
throughout the country may be attributed to some or all of the following factors: (1) society is
becoming more mobile in general; (2) the downsizing of corporate America; (3) women, who
statistically are traditionally the custodial parent, gaining a greater presence in the work force; (4)
increase in divorce and therefore second marriages; and (5) the 'grass is always greener' theory."
Cynthia Coulter George, Post-Divorce Relocation Becomes Hot Topic in Connecticut Family
Law, http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Nov/l/127161.html (last visited April 6, 2008). According
to a recent empirical study, twenty-eight percent of parents relocate due to a new job or a
spouse's new job; fifteen percent relocate for remarriage; twenty-one percent move for multiple
reasons that provide long-term economic benefits; and eleven percent relocate to live near relatives. See Glennon, supra, at 125.
3 See Cagle, supra note 2, at 256 (noting growing divorce rate and mobility of society as reasons why relocation litigation is an important topic in family court); Janet Leach Richards, Children's Rights v. Parent'sRights: A Proposed Solution to the Custodial Relocation Conundrum,
29 N.M. L. REV. 245, 245 (1999) (explaining common relocation situations as those involving
remarriage, children of the remarriage and previous marriage, and job transfers).
4 See Baures, 770 A.2d at 217 (emphasizing when non-custodial parent objects "[t]here
rarely is an easy answer or even a satisfactory one."); Hon. W. Dennis Duggan, Rock-PaperScissors: Playing the Odds with the Law of Child Relocation, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 193, 193 (2007)
(advocating that child custody cases, specifically relocation cases, should not be subjected to adversarial litigation process because outcome for child is often no "better ... than if the parents did
rock-paper-scissors."). "[Cihild custody determination is much more difficult and subtle than an
arithmetical computation of factors. It is one of the most demanding undertakings of a trial judge
...a task requiring him to discern and feel the climate and chemistry of the relationships between
children and parents." Foskett v. Foskett, 634 N.W.2d 363, 368 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). Several
Massachusetts Probate & Family Court judges have expressed the same sentiment as to the difficulty of trying relocation cases. See Edward M. Ginsburg, Commentary: Requests to Relocate
with Minor Children Make for Tough Decisions, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 2, 2006 (noting that
"[n]o decisions are more difficult for a judge than when one parent seeks to relocate a long distance with the minor children, a move that will certainly impact the relationship of the other parent with the children."); Edward J. Rockett, Letter to the Editor, Real Advantage Standard Should
be Eliminated, MASS. LAW. WKLY., April 16, 2007 (stating "the most difficult, perplexing cases
that Probate & Family Court judges are called upon to decide are such cases.").
5 See Cagle, supra note 2, at 256 (acknowledging difficulty family court judges experience in
resolving relocation cases); Paige M. Dempsey, Note, Joint Custody and Relocation: The Supreme Court of Nebraska Limits Relocation of Parents Sharing Joint Custody' in Brown v.
Brown, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 185 (2001) (noting child custody and parental relocation
cases most difficult to decide); Richards, supra note 3, at 245 (acknowledging dilemma between
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This Note explores the different national approaches to the relocation challenge; specifically, it addresses the standard used in relocation
cases in Massachusetts as compared to the standard employed in New Jersey.' Section II outlines the national trend involving relocation cases and
identifies the different models and standards used by courts across the nation to decide such issues.7 Section III focuses on the history of Massachusetts relocation law, primarily focusing on the statute governing relocation
and relevant case law interpreting the statute. 8 Section III further addresses
the history and current state of relocation law in New Jersey, the state from
which Massachusetts borrowed both its current relocation statute and standard. 9 Section IV analyzes the shortcomings of both the Massachusetts
statute and case law interpreting the statute, and recommends that Massachusetts adopt a standard comparable to that of New Jersey to evaluate relocation law.' 0 Section V concludes with a recommendation that Massachusetts again follow New Jersey's lead and abandon the real advantage
standard.'' In doing so, Massachusetts 12can adopt a test more conducive to
the realities inherent in today's society.
II. NATIONAL TRENDS IN RELOCATION LAW
Several different issues contribute to the relocation conundrum
across the country. On a national scale, relocation law lacks uniformity
and consistency, causing much confusion and unpredictability as to how
any given court will rule.' 3 With no uniform approach, each state advo-

custodial parent being "held hostage" and non-custodial parent viewing move as "threat to the
parent-child relationship.").
6 The term "relocation" is used throughout this Note to characterize the phenomenon of one
parent moving out of state with the minor child. Please note, however, that state legislatures,
courts, and authors of scholarly articles use the words "relocation" and "removal" interchangeably to characterize the same phenomenon.
7 See infra Part 11(exploring national approaches to relocation).
8 See in/i-a Part III.A (discussing the real advantage standard).
9 See infra Part 1l.B (exploring New Jersey child relocation law jurisprudence).
10 See iq/i-a Part IV (analyzing Massachusetts child relocation law jurisprudence).
1 See infra Part V (recommending adoption of New Jersey relocation law jurisprudence in
Massachusetts).
12 See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 480-81 (Cal. 1996) (explaining it is "unrealistic to assume that divorced parents will permanently remain in the same location after dissolution or to exert pressure on them to do so"); Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852, 854-55 (N.J. 1988)
("In every divorce, the family unit is broken, and the relationship between the parties irrevocably
changed . . . As men and women approach parity, the question arises when a custodial mother
wants to move from one state to another, why not?"); see also supra note 1 and accompanying
text (outlining likelihood that custodial parent will move).
13 See Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 217 (N.J. 2001) (noting confusion among the bench,
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cates its own approach in dealing with the issue of the custodial parent's
desire to move out of state with a child.' 4 Despite the lack of uniformity, a
trend in favor of granting relocation has emerged across the country.15 The
American Law Institute, for example, advocates the view that "[t]he court
should allow a parent who has been exercising the clear majority of custodial responsibility to relocate with the child if that parent shows that the relocation is for a valid purpose, in good faith, and to a location that is reasonable in light of the purpose."' 6 States adopting a more liberal view of
relocation have undoubtedly recognized several aspects of a changing society, including advanced technology and an increase in relocation due to
employment opportunities. 17 Some states, however, have continued to ad-

Bar, and litigants over legal standards to apply to relocation cases); Charles P. Kindregan, Jr.,
Familv Interests in Competition. Relocation and Visitation, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 31, 60 (2002)
(concluding that relocation law is in a "state of disarray").
14 See Baures, 770 A.2d at 217 (discussing how courts around the country grapple with issue
of relocation but have not yet developed a uniform approach); see also Cagle, supra note 2, at
259 (noting states have taken divergent approaches to issue of relocation); Kindregan, Family
Interests, supra note 13, at 60 (declaring greater uniformity needed to deal with wide range of
state approaches); Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Relocation Law in Massachusetts Compared to the
Determination of Such Cases in Georgia and Two Other States, THE FAMILY LAW REVIEW
(Family Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia, Atlanta, GA), May 2006 (noting absence of
uniform law has resulted in each state forming its own set of standards for resolving relocation
issues).
15 See Baures, 770 A.2d at 222 (acknowledging that historically relocation was disfavored,
but courts have since reassessed burden imposed on custodial parent in light of a changing society); see also Cagle supra note 2, at 259 (indicating a majority trend in favor of relocation);
Laura Caviness Cocus, Comment, Louisiana's Restrictive Relocation Laws: Jeopardizing Stabilit' in Custodial Arrangements for the Sake of Geographical Proximity Between Divorced Parents, 53 Loy. L. REV. 79, 104 (2007) ("[I]n the last decade, the highest courts in several jurisdictions have issued significant decisions ... demonstrating that the contemporary view is one that
favors relocation."); Peterson, supra note 1 (noting a growing number of states now presume that
custodial parent's decision to move is in best interests of child).
16 AMERICAN

LAW INSTITUTE,

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW

OF FAMILY

DISSOLUTION:

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 2.17, (4)(a) p. 355 (2002).

17 See Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 109 S.W.3d 657 (Ark. 2003); Baures, 770 A.2d at 222.
New Jersey and Arkansas are two such states that have taken a liberalized view to relocation. See
Hollandsworth, 109 S.W.3d at 653; Baures, 770 A.2d at 222. In both the Baures and Hollandsworth cases, much of the judges' opinions emphasized the mobility of the U.S. population due to
the global economy and new employment opportunities. Baures, 770 A.2d at 222; see also Hollandsworth, 109 S.W.3d at 658. The judges also cited the increased ability to communicate over
long distances due to the internet and low long-distance telephone rates as reasons to allow relocation. See Baures, 770 A.2d at 222. In Hollandsworth, Arkansas's highest court cited the
Baures decision, announcing a presumption in favor of relocation for custodial parents with primary custody. Hollandsworth, 109 S.W.3d at 657. See generally Sarah Gottfried, Virtual Visitation: The Wave of the Future in Communication Between Children and Non-Custodial Parents in
Relocation Cases, 36 FAM. L.Q. 475 (2002) (discussing methods of technology ordered by courts
in relocation cases); M. Dee Samuels and Randall Friesen, E- Visiting and Other Long-Distance
Links, 26 FAM. ADVOC. 34 (2004) (suggesting advances in technology have made it easier to
keep in touch with loved ones from long distances).
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vocate a traditional view by opposing relocation on a regular basis.' The
lack of uniformity across the country and the highly charged, emotional nature of relocation issues results in both parents bearing the costly burden of
litigation.

'9

Whether relocation law is controlled by a specific statute, a general
child custody statute, or case law depends upon the state. 2" Relocation
statutes range from very specific statutes outlining threshold requirements
and factors to warrant a grant of relocation, to general statutes only requiring court approval for relocation: In addition to these procedural differences, each state also differs in the use of presumptions and burdens of

1 See Bodne v. Bodne, 588 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. 2003) (favoring a traditional approach to relocation in forbidding use of presumptions); Kindregan, Relocation Law, supra note 14, at 17 (discussing Georgia as one state that advocated a traditional approach in Bodne v. Bodne). Although
Georgia favors a traditional approach to relocation, it does not favor a presumption against relocation. See Bodne, 588 S.E.2d at 729 (declining to follow a bright line rule or presumption). Other
more traditional states have chosen to advocate a presumption against relocation. ALA. CODE §
30-3-169.4 (2008) ("[t]here shall be a rebuttable presumption that a change of principal residence
of a child is not in the best interest of the child. The party seeking a change of principal residence
of a child shall have the initial burden of proof on the issue.").
19 See Kindregan, Family Interests, sapra note 13, at 55 (discussing fact that evolving legal
standards contribute to the need for attorney involvement and increasingly great financial cost).
Professor Kindregan emphasizes the need for dialogue amongst scholars nationally to promote a
uniform law on relocation and to address the financial burden of relocation litigation. See id. at
61.
20 Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Nebraska, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming are examples of states that
do not have a relocation statute. See Kindregan, Family Interests, supra note 13, at 56 n. 113.
Many of these states, including Connecticut and Rhode Island, derive their relocation standards
from general custody statutes qualified and clarified by case law. See Kathleen Yaeger, Note, An
Examination at Relocation Law in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhodes Island: Successful
Trends Toward Determining the Best Interests of'the Child, 10 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC.
153, 166 (2005). Examples of states that do have a specific statute addressing relocation include
Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-129(2)(c) (2005); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/609 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208,

§ 30 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West 2002); 10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 19 (West
2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-13 (1999); see also Kimberly R. Willoughby, Relocation in
Family Law Cases, 35 MAR-COLO. LAW. 47, 48-50 (2006) (discussing 2001 amendment to
Colorado Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act dealing directly with relocation requests); Yaeger,
supra, at 161 n.45 (listing states with a relocation statute).
21 See Kindregan, Relocation Law. supra note 14, at 16 (discussing specific statues requiring
notice and satisfaction of statutory enumerated factors as compared to general statutes). States
that have statutes specifically enumerating factors to be considered by a trial judge in relocation
cases include Louisiana and Colorado. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129(2)(c) (2005); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.12 (2007). Factors include the child's preference, whether the relocation will enhance the quality of life for both the custodial parent and the child, and the feasibility
of preserving a good relationship between the non-relocating parent and the child through visitation. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129(2)(c) (2005) (setting out statutory factors that a court is
required to consider in rendering a relocation decision); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.12 (2007)
(same).
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proof to analyze relocation cases.22 Courts generally tend to advocate a
presumption in favor of the custodial parent, a presumption in favor of the
non-custodial parent, or a neutral approach that involves no presumption
and instead focuses on the best interests of the child or a real advantage to
the child. 23 Some states, such as Arizona, Illinois, and Ohio, place the burden of proof on the custodial parent to prove the move is in the child's best
interests. 24 States such as California and Louisiana place the burden on the
non-custodial parent to prove that the move is disadvantageous or adverse
to the child, while others, like Nevada, Connecticut, and New Jersey, employ a shared burden on both parents at different times of the proceeding.2 5

22 See Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434, 437 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (noting different state
standards across country are "distressingly disparate.").

23 See Cagle, supra note 2, at 259 (characterizing four general approaches toward relocation
as the real advantage approach, best interests approach, presumption in favor of relocating parent
or burden on the custodial parent); Ann M. Driscoll, Note, In Search of a Standard: Resolving the
Relocation Problem in New York, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 178 (1997) (identifying three approaches to relocation law in favor of either the custodial parent, non-custodial parent, or neutral
approach "whereby the court only considers best interests of the child."); Robert E. Oliphant, Relocation Custody Disputes-A Binuclear Family-Centered Three-Stage Solution, 25 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 363, 367 (2005) (acknowledging that courts favor the custodial parent, non-custodial parent,
or neither, in using presumptions or a direct allocation of the burden of proof). Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsin advocate a presumption in favor of the custodial parent. See
10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 19 (West 2007) ("A parent entitled to the custody of a child has a
right to change his residence, subject to the power of the district court to restrain a removal which
would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-13 (1999) ("A
parent entitled to the custody of a child has the right to change his residence..."); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 767.481(3) (West 2007) ("There is a rebuttable presumption that continuing the current
allocation of decision making under a legal custody order or continuing the child's physical
placement with the parent with whom the child resides for the greater period of the time is in the
best interest of the child."); Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1983) (holding the custodial parent presumptively has the right to relocate). Alabama is one state that has a statutory
presumption against relocation. ALA. CODE § 30-3-169.4 (2008) ("[t]here shall be a rebuttable
presumption that a change of principal residence of a child is not in the best interest of the child.
The party seeking a change of principal residence of a child shall have the initial burden of proof
on the issue.").
24 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408 (G) (West 2008) ("The burden of proving what is in
the child's best interests is on the parent who is seeking to relocate the child."); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/609 (West 1999) ("The burden of proving that such removal is in the best interests
of such child or children is on the party seeking the relocation."); Rozborski v. Rozborski, 686
N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) ("The moving party bears the burden of establishing
whether the requested relocation is in the best interest of the child.").
25 See generally Oliphant, supra note 23, at 367-68 (outlining different state relocation standards, including the burden-shifting approach); Richards, supra note 3, at 249-52 (discussing how
presumptions vary by state). States placing the burden on the non-custodial parent include California and Louisiana. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 482-83 (Cal. 1996) ("It has
long been established that ... the 'general rule [is that] a parent having child custody is entitled to
change residence unless the move is detrimental to the child."'); Evans v. Lungrin, 708 So. 2d
731, 738 (La. 1998) ("The burden of proving [a major decision by the domiciliary parent] is not
in the best interest of the child is placed on the non-domiciliary parent who opposes the deci-
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Another facet complicating the relocation problem across the country is the custodial parent's right to travel. 26 Although some courts have
upheld the custodial parent's constitutional right to travel as the motivating
factor in granting relocation, most courts have avoided a steadfast rule.27 In
these states, such as Wyoming, courts have upheld relocation in light of the
inequity created by affording the non-custodial parent the right to travel to
seek a better lifestyle but inhibiting the already burdened custodial parent
from pursuing similar opportunities. 2 8 Other courts qualify the parent's

constitutional right to travel in light of the state's interest in protecting the
sion."). Minnesota, South Dakota, and Tennessee are states that also have eased the burden on
the custodial parent. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 214 (Minn. 1988) (holding relocation will be permitted unless the non-custodial parent meets his burden to prove that the move is
not in the best interests of the child and the move will endanger the child's health); Fortin v.
Fortin, 500 N.W.2d 229, 233 (S.D. 1993) (interpreting state statute as creating presumption for
relocation); Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 332 (Tenn. 1993) (finding strong presumption in
favor of custodial parent). Nevada, Connecticut, and New Jersey employ burden shifting analyses. See Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 682 (Conn. 1998) (placing burden on custodial parent
to prove move is for a legitimate purpose and to a reasonable location, then on non-custodial parent to prove move is not in child's best interests); Cook v. Cook, 898 P.2d 702, 705-07 (Nev.
1995) (allocating burden to custodial parent to prove the move is an advantage, then shifting burden to non-custodial parent to show move is not in the child's best interests); Baures v. Lewis,
770 A.2d 214, 230-31 (N.J. 2001) (instituting initial burden on custodial parent to prove good
faith reason for the move and that move is not inimical to best interests of child, and then shifting
burden to non-custodial parent to produce evidence to the contrary). Colorado courts have held
that the burden is shared between both parents. See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 146
(Colo. 2005).
26See Kindregan. Fanily Interests, supra note 13, at 46-50 (surveying history of the constitutional right to travel); Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A ConstitutionalPerspective. 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 10-11 (1995) (arguing that state courts should uphold
constitutional right of relocating mother over non-moving father); see also Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) ("[A]ll citizens [have the right to] be free to travel throughout the
length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably
burden or restrict this movement.").
27 Compare Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 615 (Wyo. 1999) ("the rights of a parent and the
duty of the courts to adjudicate custody serve as a premise for restricting or inhibiting the freedom of travel of a citizen of the state of Wyoming and of the United States of America."), with
Mason v. Coleman, 850 N.E.2d 513, 521 (Mass. 2006) (holding Massachusetts statute does not
restrict mother's right to travel), and Cagle, supra note 2, at 257 (asserting state courts are reluctant to decide relocation cases based on the constitutional rights of the parents).
28 See Watts, 971 P.2d at 616 (declaring the non-custodial parent's uninhibited right to travel
and freedom from questioning of his motives by the court as another reason to allow relocation);
see also D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), a/i'dper curiam, 365 A.2d 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (holding because the custodial parent cannot
restrain the non-custodial parent from moving, the custodial parent should have same option to
seek better life); Cocus, supra note 15, at 87 (criticizing Louisiana's relocation law for constraining only the custodial parent and as such violating the constitutional right to travel). See generally Kindregan, Family Interests, supra note 13, at 49 (noting that most courts view the constitutional right to travel within the larger family law policies); Peterson, supra note 1,at 16-17
(discussing that the constitutional right to travel does not extend beyond variations of the "best
interests of the child" standard).
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best interests of the child.29 What weight a custodial parent's constitutional
right to travel will be given in a relocation case depends entirely upon the
view of the particular state, further aggravating the inconsistency and lack
of uniformity inherent in the relocation problem.30
III. EVOLUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW JERSEY
RELOCATION LAW
A. Massachusetts:Application of the Real Advantage Standard
Relocation law in Massachusetts is governed by statute. 3' Drafted
in 1842 and amended in 1860, 1882, 1903, 1931, and 1986 chapter two
hundred and eight, section thirty ("section thirty") was originally enacted to
ensure the jurisdiction of Massachusetts courts over custody, support, and
modification matters.3 2 The statute requires both parents to consent to the
relocation of a minor child out of state, unless the court allows relocation
upon cause shown. 33 The Massachusetts relocation statute, unlike the
29 See, e.g., Braun v. Healey, 750 A.2d 624, 635 (Md. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1191

(2001) (holding a parent's constitutional right to travel is not paramount over state's interest in
preserving the best interests of the child, but should be given consideration); In re Custody of
D.M.G., 951 P.2d 1377, 1383-85 (Mont. 1998) (same); In re Marriage of Cole, 729 P.2d 1276,
1280 (Mont. 1986) (qualifying custodial parent's constitutional right to travel in light of best interests of child and competing interests of non-custodial parent); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d
299, 305-06 (N.M. 1991) (upholding custodial parent's constitutional right to travel in light of
non-custodial parent s right to frequent visitation); Lane v. Schenck, 614 A.2d 786, 790-91 (Vt.
1992) (holding the relative inquiry is whether it is in the best interest of the child to continue living with the parent who wishes to relocate).
30 See Linda Lea M. Viken, Evaluating the Relocation Case. 28 FAM. ADVOC. 12, 13 (2006).
Viken discusses the three approaches advocated by courts when considering the parent's right to
travel as outlined in the Colorado case of Ciesluk v. Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2005). Id. The
three approaches are: (1) holding a relocating parent's right to travel over competing interests
(similar to Watt); (2) characterizing the child's welfare/best interests as a compelling state interest; and (3) holding all competing interests as equal with the burden on the parent to show that
relocation serves the child's best interests (similar to Jaramnillo). Id
31 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 30 (2007).
32 Id.; see also

CHARLES

P.

KINDREGAN,

JR.,

ET AL.,

MASSACHUSETTS

DOMESTIC

RELATIONS RULES AND STATUTES ANNOTATED 292 (Thomson West 2006). Custody, support,
and modification are today controlled by statutes like the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.
See id at 293.
33 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 30 (2007). The statute states:
a minor child of divorced parents who is a native of or has resided five years within
this commonwealth and over whose custody and maintenance a probate court has jurisdiction shall not, if of suitable age to signify his consent, be removed out of this
commonwealth without such consent, or, if under that age, without the consent of both
parents, unless the court upon cause shown otherwise orders.
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property division and alimony statutes, does not set out factors that a court
must consider, but instead only requires that
a parent obtain court approval
34
prior to moving out of state with the child.
Both the age and generality of the Massachusetts statute complicates several aspects of relocation law. Read literally, section thirty does
not apply to children born out of wedlock.3
Massachusetts appellate
courts, however, have indicated that in the non-divorce context (i.e., a paternity case) the same section thirty standard governs. 36 The Massachusetts
statute also fails to address the situation where a custodial parent and the
child move a great distance away from the non-custodial parent, yet remain
in the state. 37 Like relocation in the non-divorce setting, at least one appellate court has analogized an intrastate
move of great distance to an inter38
state move, thus invoking the statute.

Relocation may be granted even if one parent refuses to consent if
the court orders it upon cause shown.3 9 Upon cause shown requires that re-

Id.

34 Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 30 (2007), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10129(2)(c) (2005) (setting out statutory factors court is required to consider in rendering relocation
decision), and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.12 (2007). The Massachusetts legislature has opted
to enumerate statutory factors in different domestic relations' context-that of alimony and property division. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (2007). Trial judges are required to weigh
and consider all statutory factors before fashioning a property division or alimony order. See Bianco v. Bianco, 358 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Mass. 1976) (discussing requirement that judges consider
all factors while noting requirement does not limit trial judge's discretion, but simply limits its
scope).
35 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 30 (2007) ("minor child of divorced parents who is a native
") (emphasis added).
36 See Wakefield v. Hegarty, 857 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (declaring section
thirty the applicable standard because children born to unmarried parents are "entitled to the same
rights and protections of the law as other children."); E.T. v. J.C., 798 N.E.2d 585 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2003) (trying case under section thirty analysis per agreement by the parties while reserving
the mother's right to raise a potential jurisdictional issue on appeal). But see Mason v. Coleman,
850 N.E.2d 513, 515 n. I (Mass. 2006) (stating section thirty governs children of divorced parents
while noting in footnote that "certain children are excepted from the statute's provisions.").
37 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 30 (2007) ("be removed out of this commonwealth without
such consent...") (emphasis added). Michigan, however, does not limit out of state relocation;
rather, it limits a change in the legal residence of the child to a location within 100 miles of the
child's residence on the date the action commences. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.31 (2007).
" See D.C. v. J.S., 790 N.E.2d 686, 689 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). In D.C. v. J.S., the mother
wished to relocate the children from Norwell to Holyoke. Id. at 688. The court held that an analogy to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 30 was proper since "the consideration and evaluation of the
visitation and other custodial conditions for the child that would result from relocation to a distant
part of the State will resemble those applied to removal beyond the State boundaries." Id. at 690.
The court limited its holding only to intrastate moves that cause significant disruption to the noncustodial parent's rights to visitation. Id.
39 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 30 (2007) (emphasis added).
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location be in the best interests of the child. 40 In Massachusetts, the applicable legal standard for calculating the best interests of the child in relocation cases depends upon whether the parents have a joint custody arrangement or whether one parent has sole physical custody.4 1 Where one parent
has primary custody, the Supreme Judicial Court announced in Yannas v.
Frondistou-Yannas42 that relocation would be granted upon cause shown
by applying the real advantage standard to determine whether the move
was in the best interests of the child.4 3 When parents enjoy a joint custody
arrangement, the governing standard to determine upon cause shown is the
traditional best interests of the child standard,
as articulated by the Supreme
44
Judicial Court in Mason v. Coleman.
In Yannas, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court announced
that the real advantage standard would be the applicable standard, where
one parent has custody, to determine whether the best interests of the child
were served by the move. 45 In this case, the mother sought permission
from the court to relocate with the minor children to Greece.46 Looking to
New Jersey for guidance on how to interpret upon cause shown, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the real advantage standard in allowing the
mother to relocate to Greece with her children.47 The court reasoned that

40 See Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 518; Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1158
(Mass. 1985).
41 Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 515.
42 481 N.E.2d 1153 (Mass. 1985).
43 See id.at 1157.
44 See Mason v. Coleman, 850 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Mass. 2006). In Mason, the mother wished
to relocate to Bristol, Rhode Island to be with her new husband. Id. at 516. Prior to the mother
seeking the father's permission to move to RI, the father moved to Nashua, New Hampshire-a
move to which the mother objected but did not file suit. Id. at 515. The court held that although
the relocation statute is applicable to this situation, upon cause shown in this situation did not implicate the real advantage standard, but instead required a showing that the move was in the
child's best interests. Id. In articulating the new standard and holding that the move was not in
the children's best interests, the court reasoned that in a true shared physical custody setting, a
judge is less inclined to find it necessary to hold one parent's interest superior to the other's, and
also less apt to honor the notion that the custodial parent's happiness is so interwoven with that of
the child. Id. at 519. One trial court judge has criticized the Mason case for failing to articulate
why a thirty minute move (the distance from the child's residence to the father's new residence)
is acceptable, while a forty-five minute move (the added time it would take the father to travel to
the mother's new residence) proves unacceptable. See Duggan, supra note 4, at 204 ("the rule in
Massachusetts is what'? A joint custodian cannot move more than a net 45-minute drive from the
other custodial parent, but that other parent can move 30 minutes away?"). Judge Duggan further
disagreed with the Supreme Judicial Court's ultimate holding in Mason, stating, "on the facts
stated, I believe that any four of five trial judges in America would have allowed the mother to
move. In this case, the mother hit the fifth judge." Id.
45 See Yannas, 481 N.E.2d at 1157.
46 Id. at 1157.

47 See id. The real advantage standard was first articulated in the case of Hale v. Hale, 429
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the standard recognizes the idea that because the best interests of the child
are so dependent on the well-being of the custodial parent, the custodial
parent's interests inevitably are a consideration in determining the child's
best interests.4 8
The Yannas court set forth a two-part inquiry to be applied by Massachusetts courts deciding relocation cases. 49 First, the court is to consider
whether there is a good reason, or a real advantage, for the move.5 0 A
judge will consider both the "soundness of the reason for moving, and the
presence or absence of a motive to deprive the non-custodial parent of reasonable visitation.'
Courts have qualified economic reasons, family living in another jurisdiction, and desire to relocate with a new spouse as real
advantages to the custodial parent sufficient to meet the first inquiry.5 2
N.E.2d 340 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981), where the Massachusetts Appeals Court first adopted the less
strict standard announced in the New Jersey case D 'Onofrio v. D 'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), aff'dper curiam, 365 A.2d 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). Id.
48 See id (quoting Cooper v. Cooper, 491 A.2d at 606, 612 (N.J. 1984)). The real advantage
standard is the:
realization that after a divorce a child's subsequent relationship with both parents can
never be the same as before the divorce . . . [and] that the child's quality of life and
style of life are provided by the custodial parent ... [B]ecause the best interests of a
child are so interwoven with the wellbeing of the custodial parent, the determination of
the child's best interest requires that the interests of the custodial parent be taken into
account.
Id. at 1157-58.
49 Id. at 1158. In Yannas, the court found that the move was advantageous to the custodial
parent financially, emotionally and socially because her family lived in Greece and she would
obtain better employment there. Id. The move was an advantage to the children because they
would be near family, attend a top school system, and become familiarized with their culture. Id.
The move was not against the interests of the non-custodial parent who had large blocks of time
off to travel to Greece and traveled there often. Id.
50 Id. In determining whether the custodial parent has established a good, sincere reason for
the move, the court must evaluate the move's advantages to the custodial parent, the custodial
parent's reasons for moving, and whether or not the custodial parent possesses a motive to deprive the non-custodial parent of visitation. Id.
51 Id. "The focus . . . is on the reasoning of the custodial parent." See Dickenson v.
Cogswell, 848 N.E.2d 800, 805 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (denying relocation).
52 See Pizzino v. Miller, 858 N.E.2d 1112, 1117 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (finding moving to be
with spouse is real advantage); Vertrees v. Vertrees, 508 N.E.2d 868, 869 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)
(establishing "real advantage" requirement satisfied by showing of emotional and social advantages to be gained from moving closer to family members); Signorelli v. Albano, 486 N.E.2d 750,
751 (Mass. App. Ct 1985) (finding "real advantage" for mother where new husband with whom
she just had a baby lived in New Jersey). The Pizzino court announced a per se rule qualifying
remarriage as a good and sincere reason:
Today, we conclude that a sincere desire to be with a spouse is, per se ... a real advantage to the custodial parent in moving. It is not our function as judges to conduct reviews of the wisdom of decisions of competent adults to marry ... A finding that there
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If the parent establishes a good and sincere reason for the move,
then the second part of the inquiry is whether the relocation is in the best
interests of the child.53 The best interests of the child analysis incorporates
all relevant factors and considers the interests of the child, the custodial
parent, and the non-custodial parent collectively, with no one interest controlling.54 At this stage of the inquiry, a judge is to consider factors such as
whether the move will improve the child's quality of life, the potential effect on the child's relationship with the non-custodial parent, and the impact of the move on the child's emotional, physical, and developmental
needs.55 It is at this stage that careful fact-finding on the part of the trial
judge is crucial.56 Several appellate courts have emphasized the importance of considering the improved quality
of life of the custodial parent
57
throughout both stages of the analysis.
Courts have seen a surge in litigation of relocation cases since the
Yannas decision, particularly since 2006.58 A number of cases since Yan-

is no "real advantage" to the spouse in such a move is illogical and impermissible.
Pizzino, 858 N.E.2d at 1119-20.
The court noted that unless the mother was motivated principally by the desire to deprive the father of visitation, remarriage is a real advantage or good and sincere reason. See id at 1120.
53 See Yannas, 481 N.E.2d at 1153.
54 See id. At least one Massachusetts Probate & Family Court judge has criticized the real
advantage standard as failing primarily to consider the best interests of the child. See Rockett,
supra note 4 (recommending the elimination of the real advantage standard).
55 See Dickenson, 848 N.E.2d at 804-05; Rosenthal v. Maney, 745 N.E.2d 350, 358-59
(Mass. App. Ct. 2001).
56 See Yannas, 481 N.E.2d at 1153 ("The judicial safeguard of those interests lies in careful
and clear fact-finding..."); see also Abbott v. Virusso, 862 N.E.2d 52, 57 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007),
aff'd, 2008 WL 384143 (Mass. 2008) (quoting Yannas).
57 See Abbott, 862 N.E.2d at 58-59 (vacating judgment denying relocation where trial court
considered only negative effects of move on child's relationship with father and sister while failing to consider quality of life of custodial parent); Pizzino, 858 N.E.2d at 1121 (emphasizing custodial parent's improved quality of life should be considered at both stages of inquiry "for the
simple reason that her quality of life has a direct and immediate impact on the welfare of the children."); Rosenthal, 745 N.E.2d at 359 (reversing judgment denying relocation where trial judge
made no findings regarding improvement of custodial parent's quality of life or custodial parent's
relationship with child).
58 Compare Mason v. Coleman, 850 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Mass. 2006) (rejecting move from
Chelmsford, Massachusetts to Bristol, New Hampshire as against best interests of children in
joint custody situation), and Dickenson, 848 N.E.2d at 808 (denying relocation from Massachusetts to California because although mother had sincere reasons, the move was not in best interests of child and had negative impact on the non-custodial parent's relationship with child), and
Kendrick v. Andrews, No. 05-P-1340, 2006 WL 3019220 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (failing to grant
relocation to Georgia), and Tufts v. Tufts, 2006 WL 2072937, No. 05-P-329 (Mass. App. Ct.
2006) (rejecting relocation where mother's family resided in Virginia but she did not have a career opportunity, because no real advantage existed for move and move was not in best interests
of child), with Williams v. Pitney, 567 N.E.2d 894 (Mass. 1991) (upholding trial court's decision
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nas that interpret and apply the real advantage standard have demonstrated
that relocation issues depend upon the specific facts and circumstances of
each individual case. 5 9 Appellate courts generally defer to the trial judge's
findings of fact, as the trial judge is in a better position to make such findings than the appellate level courts.60 In applying the real advantage standard, courts are consistent in finding that the custodial parent satisfies the
minimum showing of a real advantage, or a good and sincere reason, for
the move. 61 Thus, the outcome of a relocation case is most often dictated
to permit relocation where mother had family and friends in new location and mother's unhappiness would adversely affect children if move denied), andAbbott, 862 N.E.2d at 62 (vacating trial
court judgment denying relocation and remanding to trial court to evaluate collective interests of
parties), and Cartledge v. Evans, 855 N.E.2d 429, 433 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (granting relocation
to Connecticut where mother and child had close family connections and alternative visitation
possible because new residence not distant from Boston), andPizzino, 858 N.E.2d 1120 (vacating
judgment denying relocation due to judge's devaluation of mother's remarriage as factor in favor
of move's real advantage), and Wakefield v. Hegarty, 857 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006)
(finding relocation to St. Croix was real advantage to mother emotionally and financially, in best
interests of child because improvement of mother's life would inure to child's benefit, and would
not deprive non-custodial parent of reasonable visitation), and Rosenthal, 745 N.E.2d at 350 (reversing trial court's judgment denying relocation), and Vertrees v. Vertrees, 508 N.E.2d 868, 869
(Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (affirming trial court decision that move met real advantage standard), and
Signorelli v. Albano, 486 N.E.2d 750, 751-52 (Mass. App. Ct 1985) (remanded to determine
whether interests of all parties could be served by move).
59 See Yannas, 481 N.E.2d at 1158 (noting that "[u]nless one is to apply a fixed but arbitrary
rule, the issue can be resolved only on a case by case basis.").
60 See Barboza v. McLeod, 853 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Mass. 2006) (finding trial judge's "findings
of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous"). "Where subsidiary findings are not clearly
erroneous, we will generally not attempt to make the ultimate decisions at the appellate level.
The trial judge is in a position far superior to our own with respect to these judgments, and absent
an abuse of discretion, we do not presume to interfere." Pizzino, 858 N.E.2d at 1118-19. Where
the evidence establishes that a request should have been allowed, a remand is unnecessary. See
Rosenthal, 745 N.E.2d at 362 (citing Gridley v. Beausoleil, 454 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1983)). Several appellate courts have questioned a judge's findings in the relocation context.
See Abbott, 862 N.E.2d at 58-59 (remanding for more findings where trial judge's findings focused solely on negative impact of move on father-son relationship); Cartledge, 855 N.E.2d at
432-33 (reversing where judge's findings that mother did not have sincere and good reasons were
clearly erroneous); Piz:ino. 858 N.E.2d at 1119-20 (finding the trial judge's erroneous treatment
that the mother's remarriage was not a good and sincere reason may have influenced findings as
to child's interests and thus remand necessary); Rosenthal, 745 N.E.2d at 359 (reversing judgment denying relocation where judge's findings were clearly erroneous). Judge Dennis Duggan,
a New York family court judge, recently commented on appellate review of Massachusetts trial
court relocation decisions, stating "Massachusetts is an example of another state that has covered
this area of law with bromides and platitudes to the point where the only standard of appellate
review is whether or not the appellate court agrees with the trial judge." Duggan, supra note 4, at
203.
61 See, e.g.. Williams, 567 N.E.2d at 898 (finding real advantage where mother would be
close to family and friends and would have better job); Cartledge, 855 N.E.2d at 432 (allowing
relocation where mother's reasons included living rent-free with her family, a new job, and taking
advantage of availability of child-care assistance from family in Connecticut while she looked for
job); Rosenthal, 745 N.E.2d at 359 (allowing relocation to Rhode Island where mother estab-
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by the court's application of the fact-specific, second prong of the real advantage standard: the balancing of the collective interests of the parties.6 2
As a result, in order to explore the application of the real advantage standard in Massachusetts, an in-depth assessment of the facts of several pertinent cases is appropriate.3
In Vertrees v. Vertrees,64 decided shortly after Yannas, the court affirmed the trial court judgment allowing relocation to Illinois where the
schools were sound and where the children could be close to both maternal
and paternal grandparents.65 Although the move would decrease the children's contact with their father, the court found that "[t]he detrimental effect [of being apart from their father] would be outbalanced by the
strengthening of the custodial home in the community of [the wife's] supportive relatives. 66 The custodial parent's interests were also controlling
in the decision of Williams v. Pitney,67 where the court granted the mother's
request to remove the child to California. 68 The court briefly discussed the
collective interests balancing, finding that the move to California was in the
best interests of the child due to the relief of the mother's financial stress
and unhappiness. 69 The court did not detail the interests of the noncustodial parent in the collective interests analysis, instead stating that
"[a]ny possible adverse effect on the children caused by a decrease in time
with their father, will be more than offset by the uplifting effect upon them
of a mother who is happy and alive with enthusiasm and excitement." 7 °
Another example of a court's willingness to elevate the interests of
lished good, sincere reason due to better financial situation, desire to be with new husband, and
elimination of long work commute); Vertrees, 508 N.E.2d at 869 (establishing that move was a
real advantage to the mother where there existed emotional and social advantages to be gained
from moving closer to family members); Signorelli, 486 N.E.2d 750 (finding "real advantage" to
mother where new husband with whom she just had a baby lived in New Jersey).
62 See intra text accompanying notes 64-89 (discussing cases in which the courts have focused on second prong of real advantage standard in their analysis).
63 See infra text accompanying notes 64-89 (featuring fact-specific, in-depth discussion of
relevant Massachusetts relocation cases).
64 508 N.E.2d 868 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
65 See Vertrees, 508 N.E.2d at 870.
66 Id. The court also found that a visitation schedule allowing "blocks" of visitation would
enable the father and children to maintain a relationship. Id.
67 567 N.E.2d 894 (Mass. 1991).
69 See id. at 898. In granting relocation, the appellate court agreed with the trial judge that
the move would be a real advantage to the family unit, as the mother's friends and relatives resided in California, and could offer emotional support. Id. Further, the mother had greater employment opportunities in California. Id.
69 See id.
70 Id. The court noted the father's close relationship with the children and emphasized that he
coached their sports teams and served as their Cub Scout leader. See id. at 896. It did not, however, incorporate such details into the best interests calculation. See id. at 898.
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the custodial parent in the collective interests analysis is the case of Rosenthal v. Maney,71 in which the court reversed the trial court's decision denying relocation to Rhode Island. 2 The judge found, in weighing the collective interests of the parties, that the best interests of the child were satisfied
because of the improvement to the mother's life, the lack of curtailment of
the child's association with the father, and the lack of evidence suggesting
that the child would not continue to thrive if the relocation were allowed7 3
When considering the interests of the custodial parent, the court cited the
mother's improvement in her quality of life since she could maintain a
close relationship with her child and new husband, live in the city in which
she and her husband were employed, and enjoy access to the city's cultural
offerings. 74 The Rosenthal court also focused on the feasibility of alternative visitation arrangements in assessing the interests of the non-custodial
parent.75
Similarly, in a series of cases following Rosenthal, courts consistently emphasized the interests of the custodial parent when balancing the
collective interests of all parties involved.7 6 In Cartledge v. Evans,7 7 the
court reversed a trial court judgment denying the mother's request to remove the minor child to Connecticut. 78 The court found that the trial court
71 745 N.E.2d 350 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).
72 Id. at 352.
73 Id. at 358-61. In evaluating the mother's good and sincere reasons, the court emphasized
the improvement to the mother's life, citing her desire to be with her new husband, a life-long
Rhode Island resident, and the fact that both her and her husband's places of employment were in
Rhode Island. See id. 358-60. In evaluating the child's best interests, the court viewed the preservation of the child's relationship with grandparents and other extended relatives not "so important to Caleb's emotional well-being that they deserve primacy over his relationship with his
mother, who had been the primary custodial parent throughout Caleb's life." Id. at 361.
71 See id.
75 See id. In assessing the interests of the non-custodial parent, the court emphasized the
fifty-five mile distance between the two parents' residences. Id. "In this context, '[t]he reasonableness of alternative visitation arrangements should be assessed. The fact that visitation by the
non-custodial parent will be changed to his or her disadvantage cannot be controlling."' Id. (quoting Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (Mass. 1985)).
76 See Abbott v. Virusso, 862 N.E.2d 52 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007), aff'd, 2008 WL 384143
(Mass. 2008); Cartledge v. Evans, 855 N.E.2d 429 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006); Pizzino v. Miller, 858
N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006); Wakefield v. Hegarty, 857 N.E.2d 32 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
The Pizzino court vacated a judgment denying relocation, significantly holding that "a sincere
desire to be with a spouse is, per se, a good and sufficient reason that requires a finding that there
is a real advantage to the custodial parent in moving ... a finding that there is no 'real advantage'
to the spouse in such a move is illogical and impermissible." Pizzino, 858 N.E.2d at 1119. The
court held that the trial judge discounted the significance of the mother's remarriage as a per se
good and sincere reason to move to South Carolina where her husband was stationed at a military
base, and thus de-emphasis could have tainted the best interests calculation. Id. at 1120-21.
77 855 N.E.2d 429, 433 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
71 Id. at 432-33.
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placed undue weight on the disruption of the child's relationship with the
father, and that relocation should be granted to a town familiar to the child,
where the mother and child have family, and where the town is not so far
from the father to hinder visitation.79 Similarly, in weighing the collective
interests in Wakefield v. Hegarty 0 the court affirmed the trial court's decision granting the mother's relocation to St. Croix where improvement of
the mother's life would benefit the child, the child would have greater access to the mother and extended family, the child would have greater educational opportunities, and alternative visitation arrangements with the father were reasonable. 81 In the most recent relocation case, Abbott v.
Virusso, 82 the Appeals Court vacated a trial court judgment denying relocation and remanded the case where the trial court judge only made findings
as to the negative effects of the move on the child's relationship with the
son and sister.8 3 The court emphasized that the trial court judge must consider the improvement in the quality of life of the custodial parent in the
best interests of the child calculus 8 4
Not every case heard by appellate courts in Massachusetts, however, has focused on the interests of the custodial parent in the collective
weighing of interests. 85 The case Dickenson v. Cogswel18 6 is an example of
a decision where the outcome turned on the court's emphasis on the non-

79 See id. at 433. The court emphasized that disruption to visitation cannot be a controlling
factor in the analysis, or else relocation would never be granted. See id.
80 857 N.E.2d 32 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
81 Id. at 37. The court accepted the mother's reasons that her family resided there, her income
would increase, and she would be able to work from home and therefore spend more time with
her daughter, as good and sincere reasons for the move. See id. The mother's proposed alternative visitation schedule included visits in both St. Croix and Massachusetts on the child's school
holidays. Id. at 35. The court did not give separate treatment to the non-custodial parent's interests in the analysis beyond evaluating the move's effect on his visitation, the mother's promise to
keep the father fully informed, and the costs of visitation. Id. at 37.
82 862 N.E.2d 52 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007), aft'd, 2008 WL 384143 (Mass. 2008).
83 Id. at 58-59. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Appeals Court opinion in a brief
opinion. See Abbott v. Virusso, 2008 WL 384143 (Mass. 2008).
84 See Abbott, 862 N.E.2d at 59. The Appeals Court noted that the trial judge's personal
opinion that the child's best interests should be the "sole focus" of the Yannas standard may have
influenced his ruling that relocation was not in the child's best interests. Id. at 57; see also Rockett, supra note 4 (arguing that real advantage standard should be eliminated and best interests of
the child standard instituted in its place).
85 Dickenson v. Cogswell, 848 N.E.2d 800 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006); Kendrick, 2006 WL
3019220, No. 05-P-1340 (failing to grant relocation to Georgia); Tufts v. Tufts, 2006 WL
2072937, No. 05-P-329 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (rejecting relocation where mother's family resided in Virginia but she did not have a career opportunity, because no real advantage existed for
move and move was not in best interests of child).
8 848 N.E.2d 800 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
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custodial parent's interests.8 7 In this case, the balancing of competing interests did not justify relocation of the child to California where the move
would compromise the father-son relationship, force the child into leading
a bi-coastal existence, and leave the mother financially insecure. 8 The
court weighed each party's interest, but ultimately denied relocation by
agreeing with the trial court judge that "most troubling" was the move's
negative effect on the child's relationship with his father.89
B. New Jersey: A DepartureFrom the Real Advantage Standard
Relocation law in New Jersey, like Massachusetts, is governed by
statute. 90 New Jersey's statute mirrors Massachusetts's statute and prohibits the relocation of a minor child without the consent of both parents. 91
Similar to the Massachusetts statute, the New Jersey statute permits courts92
to grant relocation upon cause shown if one parent does not consent.
New Jersey, unlike Massachusetts, has rejected the93applicability of the relocation statute to distant relocation within the state.
Where one parent has sole physical custody, New Jersey articulated the real advantage standard as the governing standard to define upon

87

Id. at 805-07.

88 See id. at 805. The judge also determined that the move would not be in the best interests
of the mother, because although she was moving to be closer to her new husband, her job became
less secure and socially she would be moving away from family and friends. Id. at 807. Finally,
the judge considered the interests of the father, and determined that an alternative visitation
schedule was unreasonable and would diminish the quality of the father-son visits. Id.Similarly,
in the unpublished decision of Tufts, the court again denied relocation, holding that although the
mother's entire family lived in Virginia, she failed to prove that her ties to Virginia were strong
enough to compel relocation. See Tufts, 2006 WL 2072937 at *6. The judge in this case disagreed with the Guardian Ad Litem's recommendation that relocation was in the best interests of
the child. Id. at *2. The judge reasoned that the mother was not pursuing a clear job opportunity,
and that the child's best interests were best served by shared physical custody. Id. at *5.
89 Dickenson, 848 N.E.2d at 806. The court emphasized the distance of the move on the father-son relationship throughout both the analysis on the interests of the child and the noncustodial parent. Id. at 806-08. But see Williams, 567 N.E.2d at 898 (de-emphasizing the diminishment of the father's relationship with the children as a result of a move to California).
90 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West 2002).
91 Id.
92

Id.

93 See Schulze v. Morris, 825 A.2d 1173, 1174 (N.J. 2003) (holding that relocation to distant

location within state does not constitute relocation under the statute, but "may constitute a substantial change in circumstances" to modify the custody arrangement); SUSAN REACH WINTERS
& THOMAS D. BALDWIN, 10 NEW JERSEY PRACTICE SERIES, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE §

21.22 (2006) (noting that one court has addressed the standards to be applied to distant in-state
relocation).
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cause shown in the case of Cooper v. Cooper.94 The Massachusetts courts
soon followed, borrowing the standard undoubtedly due to the similarity
between the two states' statutes.95 New Jersey, like Massachusetts, also
distinguishes relocation cases involving the shared custody situation from a
sole physical custody situation. 96 Where parents have shared physical custody over a child, the case is not a relocation case governed by the statute,
but is a motion for a change of custody governed primarily by the best interests of the child analysis requiring a substantial change in circumstances. 97 New Jersey, however, abandoned the real advantage standardthe very standard that Massachusetts borrowed and still follows-in favor
9
of a more liberal standard articulated in the case of Holder v. Polanski. 8
In Cooper, the New Jersey Supreme Court articulated that upon
cause shown was to be determined using the real advantage standard. 99 In
that case, the mother wished to relocate to California from New Jersey with
her two minor children.100 The court remanded the case in accordance with
the real advantage standard as set out in its opinion, holding "to establish

sufficient cause for the removal, the custodial parent initially must show
that there is a real advantage to that parent in the move and that the move is

not inimical to the best interests of the children."''

The court imposed a

94 491 A.2d 606, 613 (N.J. 1984).
95 See Hale v. Hale, 429 N.E.2d 340 (Mass. 1981) (adopting the less strict real advantage
standard as set forth in D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976),
aff'dper curiam, 365 A.2d 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)); see also Yannas v. FrondistouYannas, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1153 (Mass. 1985) (following the reformulated standard as set forth in
Cooper). Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 30 (2007), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West
2002).
96 See Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 229 (N.J. 2001) (acknowledging that Cooper standard
is distinguished from shared custody circumstances where relocation spurs motion for change of
custody followed by analysis under best interests standard); Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852,
856-57 (N.J. 1988) (abolishing real advantage standard in primary custody context); Chen v.
Heller, 759 A.2d 873, 884 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (asserting correct standard in shared
custody relocation cases is not Cooper relocation standard, but a "substantial change in circumstances" test as required for a modification of custody); Voit v. Voit, 721 A.2d 317, 325 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998). In Voit, the court explained that "the whole thrust of Cooper and Holder
is, where a request for removal is made by a custodial parent, to prioritize the rights of the custodial parent and then to accommodate, as much as possible, the lesser rights of the non-custodial
parent... " and therefore, the application of a Cooper/Holderanalysis in the shared-parenting
context "would be both artificial and inappropriate." Voit, 721 A.2d at 325.
97 See Baures, 770 A.2d at 229; Herbert S.Glickman & Bari Zell-Weinberger, Burden of
Proofin Removal Cases: Who Has It-What Is It? 223 N.J. LAW 9, 10 (2003) (distinguishing between relocation case where one parent is custodial parent and application for change in custody
in shared custody situation).
98 544 A.2d 852 (N.J. 1988).
99 See Cooper, 491 A.2d at 606.
100 Id at 608.

1o1Id. at 613. The court set out a list of factors to be utilized in determining whether there is

2008]

MASSACHUSETTS CHILD RELOCATION LAW

burden on the non-custodial parent to produce evidence that an alternative
that it impeded the non-custodial
visitation schedule was so burdensome
10 2
child.
the
with
parent's relationship
New Jersey modified the real advantage standard as articulated in
Cooper in favor of a more liberal standard in favor of relocation in Holder
v. Polanski.0 3 In Holder, the mother desired to move from New Jersey to
Connecticut with the parties' minor children. 0 4 The New Jersey Supreme
Court modified its holding in Cooper stating, "any sincere, good faith reason will suffice, and that a custodial parent need not establish a 'real advantage' from the move." 10 5 The court found that once a good faith, sincere
reason for the move has been given by the custodial parent, the court will
next "consider whether the move will be inimical to the best interests of the
children or adversely affect the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent."' 106 The Holder court recognized that the real advantage standard imposed too great a burden on the custodial parent's right to move, shifting
the crucial inquiry from one focusing on whether the move would benefit
the parent, to one focusing on whether the move would adversely affect the
child."0 7 The court announced that the cause requirement in the statute required that the move be in the child's best interests only as affected by the
child's visitation with the non-custodial parent.10 8
New Jersey's highest court expanded upon the Holder decision in
establishing twelve factors "relevant to the plaintiffs burden of proving

a real advantage. ld. The first factor focuses on the move's improvement to the quality of life of
the custodial parent and the child. Id. The second factor is the integrity of both the non-custodial
parent's reasons for objecting to the move and the custodial parent's motives for the move. Id.
The third factor is whether "a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule can be reached if the
move is allowed." Id.
102 Id.at 614.
103544 A.2d 852, 856-57 (N.J. 1988).
104 Id. at 854. The mother desired to move to live closer to her sister and brother-in-law, attend the University of Bridgeport, work for her brother-in-law, and get away from her divorce and
death of her parents. Id. The father's reasons for opposing the move included the distance between New Jersey and Connecticut and the identical housing, educational, and employment opportunities offered in New Jersey and Connecticut. Id.
105 id. at 856.
106 Id. The court recognized that in "our mobile society, it may be possible to honor a [reasonable visitation] schedule and still recognize the right of a custodial parent to move." Id. at
857.
117 Id. at 857.
10 Id. at 856. The court lightened the burden on the custodial parent to prove that the move
is in the child's best interests reasoning that "[a]s men and women approach parity, the question
arises when a custodial mother wants to move from one state to another, why not?" Id. at 855;
see also Baures, 770 A.2d at 227 (characterizing the Holder decision as their recognition that "the
Cooper calculus had failed in its intent to allow custodial parents the same freedom enjoyed by
non-custodial parents to seek a better life.").
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good faith and that the move will not be inimical to the child's interest[s]"
to be considered, where applicable, in relocation cases. 10 9 In Baures v.
Lewis, the court enumerated guiding factors for trial judges to consider
when deciding relocation cases." 0 Clarifying the "template for a removal
case," the court advocated the shifting burden analysis wherein the moving
party will initially prove a "good faith reason for the move" and "that the
move [is not] inimical to the child's interests," at which point the burden
will shift to the non-moving party to disprove the showing of the primafacie case-in other words, that the move is in good faith and/or inimical to
the child's interest."' The court relaxed the custodial parent's burden in
part to post-divorce demands, the mobility of society, the ease and feasibility of long distance communication, and the social science research demonstrating a positive correlation between the happiness of the custodial parent
and the minor child.' ' 2 Since the Baures decision, several courts and commentators have cited and supported New Jersey relocation jurisprudence
3
with approval."
09

Baures, 770 A.2d at 229. The court noted that the extent to which each factor is equally

weighed and relevant will vary from case to case. Id. at 230.
0 See id. at 229-30. The twelve factors are:
(1) the reasons given for the move; (2) the reasons given for the opposition; (3) the past
history of dealings between the parties insofar as it bears on the reasons advanced by
both parties for supporting and opposing the move; (4) whether the child will receive
educational, health and leisure opportunities at least equal to what is available here; (5)
any special needs or talents of the child that require accommodation and whether such
accommodation or its equivalent is available in the new location; (6) whether a visitation and communication schedule can be developed that will allow the non-custodial
parent to maintain a full and continuous relationship with the child; (7) the likelihood
that the custodial parent will continue to foster the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent if the move is allowed; (8) the effect of the move on extended family
relationships here and in the new location; (9) if the child is of age, his or her preference; (10) whether the child is entering his or her senior year in high school at which
point he or she should generally not be moved until graduation without his or her consent; (11) whether the non-custodial parent has the ability to relocate; (12) any other
factor bearing on the child's interest.
Id.
... Id. at 230-31.
112 See id. at 222-23.
113 See Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 109 S.W.3d 653, 657-63 (Ark. 2003) (citing Cooper,
Holder, and Baures at length with approval in discussion justifying court's announced rule of
presumption in favor of relocation); In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142 (Colo. 2005)
(discussing Baures in support of promoting child's best interests in light of custodial parent's
right to travel and non-custodial parent's right to parent); see also Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 18
(Tex. 2002) (discussing factors, but distinguishing Baures, to give meaning to Texas's best interests standard in relocation context); Cocus, supra note 15, at 109 (approving New Jersey relocation law and encouraging Louisiana to follow and institute presumption in favor of relocation);
Glickman, supra note 97, at 9-10 (discussing how Baures resolves the "confusion among the
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IV. ADVOCATING FOR CHANGE IN MASSACHUSETTS
RELOCATION JURISPRUDENCE

A. Legislative Change
Given the statute's original intention for jurisdiction purposes over
one hundred years ago, the Massachusetts relocation statute lacks guidelines for domestic relations lawyers litigating relocation disputes. 1 4 The
statute proves inadequate as a controlling statute in deciding relocation
cases, as it technically only applies to children of divorced parents and further fails to address the situation where the custodial parent moves a great
distance within the state."5 Since children born out of wedlock and children born of marriage are accorded equal treatment under the law, it should
be amended accordingly to reflect the current state of the law.' 16 Although
judicial interpretation of the statute has indicated that it does constructively
apply to children born out of wedlock at the trial stage, the exclusion of
children born out of wedlock in the statute may result in the custodial parthat he or she may relocate without seeking the permission
ent's false belief
7
court."
the
of

bench, Bar and litigants over the legal standards" in relocation cases and resolves the question left
open by Cooper and Holder as to the ultimate burden of proof); Sydney Mehringer, The Meaning
and Role of "Good Faith" in Relocation Law with Respect to Child Custodv and the Impact ofln
Re Marriage of Lamusga, 35 Sw. U. L. REV. 83, 103 (2005) (arguing that California should look
to Baures case for guidance in determining meaning of"good faith"); Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert
F. Kelly, Social Science Knowledge in Family Law Cases: JudicialGate-Keeping in the Daubert
Era, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 7 (2004) (lauding Baures for its reliance on social science research
in liberalizing the relocation standard); Merle H. Weiner, Inertia and Inequality: Reconceptualizing Disputes5 Over ParentalRelocation. 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1747, 1769-71 (2007) (discussing
New Jersey's relocation jurisprudence with approval and concluding New Jersey consistently
recognizes non-custodial parent's ability to move as factor in the relocation analysis). After the
Baures decision, Professor Merle H. Weiner characterized New Jersey's relocation standard as
properly considering gender equity. by requiring consideration of a non-custodial parent's ability
to move in its rationale to liberalize its relocation standard. See Weiner, supra, at 1804 ("New
Jersey law demonstrates that a commitment to gender equity should lead courts to inquire into the
non-custodial parent's mobility").
114 See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 30 (2007).
115See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing how Massachusetts courts have
applied principles of relocation statute to non-divorce and intrastate move cases).
116 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (outlining Massachusetts courts' equal treatment of children born in and out of wedlock in recent relocation cases).
117See supra text accompanying note 35 (noting statutory language excluding children born
out of wedlock).
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B. The JudicialProblem: One InterestInevitably Controls Under the
Second Prong of the Real Advantage Standard
Massachusetts courts have attempted to ameliorate the shortcomings of the statute through judicial interpretation and construction."' The
real advantage standard clearly provides more guidance than the statute by
determining the best interests of the child by setting forth a two-part inquiry into whether the move is a real advantage to the custodial parent, and
then whether the move is in the best interests of the child. 9 Although the
judicial imposition of the real advantage standard provides more guidance
for courts to determine upon cause shown, the standard, in practice, gives
the trial judge or appellate court broad discretion in the balancing of the
collective interests of the parties. 120 In determining the best interests of the
child to satisfy the second prong of the real advantage standard, however,
the Yannas court specified that each party's interests must be weighed collectively with no one interest serving as a controllingfactor in relocation
decisions. 2' Application of the real advantage standard often results in one
interest serving as a controlling factor due to different judges giving varying weight to the interests
of the custodial parent, non-custodial parent, and
22
child in each case. 1
Several examples illustrate that the holding of Yannas-that no
single interest control the collective balancing of each party's interestshas been undermined in its application.' 23 One example is the different

18 See supra text

accompanying notes 40-57 (outlining prongs of real advantage standard to

determine upon cause shown under section thirty).
119 Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 30 (2007) (stating that a child may not "be removed out of this commonwealth without such consent, or, if under that age, without the consent
of both parents, unless the court upon cause shown otherwise orders"), with Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1153, 1158 (Mass. 1985) (interpreting upon cause shown as implicating a two party inquiry under the real advantage standard).
120See supra text accompanying notes 64-89 (outlining cases in which judges have given
greater weight to one party's interest in the best interests calculation of real advantage standard).
121 See Yannas, 481 N.E.2d at 1153 (emphasis added).
122Compare Williams v. Pitney, 567 N.E.2d 894 (Mass. 1991) (favoring custodial parent's
interests in granting move to California while hardly giving any weight to non-custodial parent's
interests), and Wakefield v. Hegarty, 857 N.E.2d 32 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (weighing custodial
parent's interests heavily in granting relocation to St. Croix), and Rosenthal v. Maney, 745
N.E.2d 350 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (focusing almost exclusively on interests of custodial parent in
granting the move), with Dickenson v. Cogswell, 848 N.E.2d 800 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (giving
more weight to non-custodial parent's interests in denying custodial parent's move to California
to be with new husband), and Tufts v. Tufts, 2006 WL 2072937, No. 05-P-329 (Mass. App. Ct.
2006) (failing to give great weight to custodial parent's desire to move to be near family in Virginia).
123 See supra note 122 and accompanying text; infra notes 124, 127 and accompanying text
(providing examples of Massachusetts cases that fail to accord equal weight to each party's inter-
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weight given to the importance of a child's relationship with grandparents
and extended relatives in the analysis. 24 In Rosenthal v. Maney, the court
evaluated the child's best interests and emphasized that the child's relationship with his grandparents and extended relatives, who were in Massachusetts, did not deserve primacy over his relationship with his mother., 2 5 In
Vertrees v. Vertrees, Wakefield v. Hegarty, and Cartledge v. Evans, on the
other hand, each court gave considerable weight to the child's relationship
of such relationships in
with extended relatives, and cited the importance
26
the best interests of the child calculation. 1
Another more striking example includes the role that distance, and
thus the effect of the move on the non-custodial parent's visitation, plays in
the collective interests of the parties calculation. 127 The decisions of Williams v. Pitney, Dickenson v. Cogswell, and Wakefield v. Hegarty all involved requests to move a great distance from Massachusetts. 28 Despite
the common variable of moving a great distance from Massachusetts, each
court gave differing weight to the negative effect the distance would have
on the9 non-custodial parent's visitation in the collective interests balanc12
ing.
In Williams, the court gave great weight to the mother's interests,
but failed to do any meaningful analysis of the effect the move to California would have on the non-custodial parent's visitation in determining that
any adverse effect on the non-custodial parent's interests was outweighed
by the custodial parent's happiness.' 30 Similarly, in granting the mother's

est).
124 Compare Rosenthal, 745 N.E.2d at 361 (giving little weight to child's relationship with
grandparents in Massachusetts), with Cartledge v. Evans, 855 N.E.2d 429, 432-33 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2006) (finding grandparents' presence in Connecticut town a factor in best interests analysis),
and Wakefield, 857 N.E.2d at 37 (considering child's access to grandparents in St. Croix in balancing of collective interests), and Vertrees v. Vertrees, 508 N.E.2d 868, 871 (Mass. App. Ct.
1987) (giving little weight to disruption in visitation with father but giving great weight to child's
increased relationship with grandparents in Illinois).
125 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (dismissing child's relationship with grandparents as strong factor in best interests analysis).
126 See supra note 124 and accompanying text (comparing weight accorded to presence of
extended relatives in best interests calculation); see also supra text accompanying notes 65-66
(examining courts' emphasis on child's relationship with grandparents in best interests analysis);
supra text accompanying notes 78-81 (discussing importance of living near extended relatives in
best interests analysis).
127 Compare Williams, 567 N.E.2d at 895 (granting move to California), and Wakefield. 857
N.E.2d at 34 (allowing move to St. Croix), with Dickenson, 848 N.E.2d at 801 (denying move to
California).
128 See supra note 127.
129 See supra text accompanying notes 68-70, 81, 87-89 (discussing Williams, Wakefield, and
Dickenson courts' different treatment of distance in analysis).
130 See supra text accompanying notes 68-70 (discussing balancing of collective interests in
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relocation to St. Croix, the Wakefield court emphasized the benefits to the
mother in moving near family and securing a better job, while determining
that the non-custodial parent's interests were satisfied by the custodial parent's proposed alternative visitation schedule on the child's school holidays.' 3' The Wakefield court gave minimal separate treatment to any other
interest of the non-custodial parent. 132 In Dickenson, however, the judge
denied the mother's move to California to be with her new husband, focusing almost exclusively on the negative impact of the child living a bicoastal life and the deprivation of a relationship with the non-custodial parent. 133 Each of these three cases involved the common variable of the custodial parent's desire to move a great distance away from Massachusetts,
and each case's outcome was based on the court's allocation of different
weight to a particular party's interest in the analysis.
The emphasis put on the quality of the custodial parent's life
throughout the real advantage analysis further demonstrates that contrary to
the Yannas decision, one interest inevitably controls a court's analysis at
the second stage of the real advantage standard. 34 In Rosenthal v. Maney,
the court solely focused on the feasibility of alternative visitation arrangements in analyzing the non-custodial parent's interests at the second stage
of the real advantage standard, reversing the trial court decision where the
judge placed undue weight on the effect of the move on the child's relationship with the father. 35 Much of the appellate court's analysis focused
on the custodial parent's interests, as the court went so far as to include the
mother's enjoyed access to the city's cultural offerings as a pertinent factor
in the collective balancing of interests. 36 The case of Abbott v. Virusso especially highlights the view that different judges give undue weight to one
party's interest. 137 There, both the Appeals Court and Supreme Judicial
Court agreed that the trial judge focused the collective balancing of all par-

Williams).
131 See supra text accompanying note 81 (outlining balancing of interests in Wakefield).
132 See supra note 81 (discussing non-custodial parent's interests only in regards to reduction
in child support to account for expensive travel and mother's promise to keep the father "fully
informed" about the child).
133 See supra text accompanying notes 87-88 (discussing effect of move on father's relationship with child).
134 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (examining appellate court cases emphasizing
custodial parent's quality of life in balancing interests analysis).
135 See supra text accompanying note 75 (discussing reasonableness of visitation schedule
where the move was only to Rhode Island).
136 See supra text accompanying note 74 (summarizing interests of custodial parent considered by the court).
137 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing appellate court's views versus trial
court's views of weight to be given to each party's interest).
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ties' interests on the negative effects of the move on the child's relationship
with the father and sister, therefore remanding the case for the trial judge to
consider the improvement of the quality of the custodial parent's life in the
analysis. 3 The trial court judge even acknowledged that, in his opinion,
the child's best interests should be the focus of the second prong of the real
be competing with the interests of the
advantage standard and should 3not
9
custodial parent in the analysis.
The varied application of the second prong of the real advantage
standard has resulted in the reversal, vacation, and remand of many reloca1 40
tion cases at the appellate level, causing much unnecessary litigation.
Although the touchstone of appellate level review is deference to the trial
judge's findings, in the relocation context in Massachusetts, this proves not
to be the case as several trial court decisions have been reversed or vacated
in light of a trial judge's erroneous findings or lack of findings.14 ' The trial
court's evaluation at the second stage of the real advantage standard, as it
matrimonial
stands now, is subject to attack at the appellate level, leaving
42
litigation.
for
preparing
in
guidance
litigators with no real
C. A Solution: Massachusetts Should Amend its Relocation Statute and/or
Abandon the Real Advantage Standard
Massachusetts Probate and Family Court judges, appellate level
judges, and matrimonial litigators are all hindered by the clouded application of the second prong of the real advantage standard. Massachusetts

138 See supra text accompanying note 83 (examining appellate court's reasoning in remanding case).
139 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (expressing appellate court's view that trial
judge's personal opinion as to the functioning of best interests standard influenced collective balancing of interests).
140 See, e.g., Abbott v. Virusso, 862 N.E.2d 52 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007), af'd, 2008 WL
384143 (Mass. 2008) (vacating trial court judgment denying relocation and remanding to evaluate
collective interests of parties); Lombardi v. Lombardi, No. 06-P-02642007, WL 1544400 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2007) (vacating judgment finding no real advantage to mother and remanding to determine, in light of the move being a real advantage to the mother, whether the move is in the best
interests of the child); Cartledge v. Evans, 855 N.E.2d 429, 433 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (reversing
trial court judgment denying relocation); Pizzino v. Miller, 858 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. App. Ct.
2006) (vacating judgment denying relocation due to judge's devaluation of mother's remarriage
as factor in favor of move's real advantage); Rosenthal v. Maney, 745 N.E.2d 350 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2001) (reversing trial court's judgment denying relocation); Signorelli v. Albano, 486 N.E.2d
750 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (remanding to determine whether interests of all parties can be served
by the move).
141 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing strict standard of appellate review
but highlighting cases in which appellate courts found trial judge's findings erroneous or lacking).
142 See supra notes 57, 60, 140 and accompanying text (listing different outcomes of cases).

164

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XIII

must clarify its relocation jurisprudence.
One solution is to amend the statute to list specific factors that a
judge must consider in assessing the best interests of the child. Massachusetts has already advocated this approach in the alimony and property division statute, and could benefit from enacting a similar statute in the relocation context. 143 By enumerating statutory factors in these family law
arenas, the state has successfully devised a workable standard, without limiting the judge's discretion.144 Some states have statutorily enumerated factors in the relocation context with much success. 145 Enumerating such factors would ameliorate the problem of unequal weighing of each party's
interest in the second stage of the collective balancing of interests, as
judges will be guided in their discretion to make findings as to each factor
in the statute, just as judges are required to do so in the alimony and prop146
erty division context in Massachusetts.
Another practical solution more in line with the history of Massachusetts relocation law entails following the lead of New Jersey to abandon
147
the very standard that Massachusetts originally borrowed from that state.
The real advantage standard in its current form does not always take into
account the interests of the custodial parent, the non-custodial parent, and
the child equally, with no one interest controlling as the Yannas decision
contemplated. 4 Depending upon the court and/or judge, each interest may
49
be accorded different weight. 1
To alleviate confusion within the bench and bar as to the standard
for a relocation case, Massachusetts should eliminate the real advantage
standard in favor of a standard that offers more guidance and consistent application. Appellate level courts have traditionally allocated equal or

143 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (2007) (listing factors to be considered in awarding
alimony and dividing property in divorce cases).
144 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Judicial Court's declaration in Bianco v. Bianco that the statutorily enumerated factors do not limit the judge's discretion,
but simply limit its scope).
145 See supra note 34 (listing the Colorado and Louisiana statutes as examples of relocation
statutes that set out specific, mandatory factors to be considered in relocation).
146 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing that requirement of trial judge to
weigh all statutory factors in alimony and property division context does not limit judge's discretion).
147 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing how Massachusetts borrowed the
real advantage standard from New Jersey); supra text accompanying notes 103-08 (outlining New
Jersey's abandonment of the real advantage standard).
148 See supra text accompanying notes 53-55 (describing consideration of collective interests
in determining best interests of child).
149 See supra notes 64-89 and accompanying test (outlining cases where judges have given
greater weight to one party's interest in best interests calculation of real advantage standard).
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greater weight to the interest of the custodial parent in the balancing of interests under the real advantage standard, though no one interest is controlling. 150 In weighing the custodial parent's interests more heavily in relocation cases despite the real advantage standard, Massachusetts appellate
courts appear to be recognizing the reality that the burden on the custodial
parent should be lightened in a mobile society where the existence of divorced and unmarried parents proves common.1 5 1 Although it is true that
bright-line rules are not effective in the relocation context, more guidance
standard could prove effective in deciding diffiimplicit in the relocation
52
cult relocation cases.
New Jersey's relocation law offers guidelines and criteria to consider in relocation decisions.153 Recent cases have clarified the "template"
to be applied in relocation situations in New Jersey, offering guidance to
litigators and judges alike. 15 4 The revolution of relocation jurisprudence in
New Jersey began with the case of Holder v. Polinski, when New Jersey's
highest court abandoned the real advantage standard in favor of a less restrictive standard, recognizing the reality of a mobile society.' 55 New Jersey relocation jurisprudence reconciles the ideals implicit in the real advantage standard-that a child's relationship will never be the same with both
parents after a divorce-with a standard that, in practice, carries out those
ideals by allowing relocation to another state so long as the move is not inimical to the best interests of the child or the visitation rights of the non56
custodial parent. 1
Following New Jersey's example, Massachusetts should shift its
analysis and focus from a blurred balancing of interests and reasons for the
move under the second prong of the real advantage standard, to an analysis
that focuses on how, if at all, the move will negatively impact the child's

150 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (examining cases where appellate courts emphasized consideration of custodial parent's quality of life in balancing interests analysis).
151 See supra notes 2-3, 17 and accompanying text (discussing changes in society that support lightened burden on custodial parent).
152 See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing how New Jersey's Baures decision, enumerating factors to consider in the relocation context, clarified New Jersey's relocation
jurisprudence among bench, bar and litigants).
153 See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text (discussing lightened Holder standard and
twelve factors announced in Baures to consider in relocation cases).
154 See supra notes 110, 113 and accompanying text (discussing twelve factors in Baures and
noting praise of court's clarification of relocation law amongst commentators and courts).
155 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (outlining new relocation standard as articulated in Holder).
156 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing principles of real advantage standard as articulated in Yannas); supra text accompanying notes 107-108 (discussing Holder standard).
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best interests and the non-custodial parent's visitation. 57 In abandoning
the real advantage standard, Massachusetts courts will afford the custodial
parent the same freedom enjoyed by the non-custodial parent to seek a better life by moving, while simultaneously keeping the best interests of the
child central to the analysis. 58 In addition, Massachusetts courts would be
in line with the American Law Institute which advocates that relocation
should be granted if relocation is in good faith, for a valid purpose, and reasonable in light of that purpose. 159 The Massachusetts courts need to ask
themselves the question that the courts in New Jersey have asked and answered: "As men and women approach parity, the question arises when
a
160
custodial mother wants to move from one state to another, why not?"'
Most significantly, in abandoning the real advantage standard,
courts could offer more predictability and guidance to trial judges and litigators by fashioning a new standard.'16 The highest court in New Jersey
recognized this unpredictability and lack of guidance when they clarified
its new standard in Baures v. Lewis by setting forth factors-such as reasons given for the move, reasons given in opposition of the move, and
whether the non-custodial parent has the ability to relocate-to be considered by a trial judge. 162 In fashioning the factors, the court noted its desire
to clarify the state of New Jersey relocation law, taking into account the national trend in easing the burden on the custodial parent due to factors such
as an increase in the divorce rate and the recognition
that a child's happi63
happiness.
parent's
custodial
the
from
stems
ness
By abandoning the real advantage test in favor of a two-pronged
test where the custodial parent must meet his burden by proving both good
faith for the move and that it will not be inimical to the best interests of the
child, and further developing a list of twelve factors to control the twopronged test, New Jersey has succeeded in providing a roadmap to both
litigators and judges lost in the relocation maze. 164 Although a New Jersey
judge does not have to consider all factors equally in any given case, he

157See supra text accompanying notes 107-108 (discussing reasoning in Holder).
158See Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852, 857 (N.J. 1988); see also Baures v. Lewis, 770
A.2d 214, 228 (N.J. 2001).
159See supra text accompanying note 16 (noting relocation principles of American Law Institute).
160 Holder, 544 A.2d at 855; see also Baures, 770 A.2d at 227 (quoting Holder).
161See supra note 140 and accompanying text (listing cases remanded, vacated, or reversed
by appellate level courts).
162See supra note 110 (listing twelve factors New Jersey courts assess in determining
whether to grant relocation).
163 See Baures, 770 A.2d at 222-24.
'64 See id. at 230.
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nevertheless is bound to consider each factor where applicable, unlike in
Massachusetts where a judge has
no guidance when faced with difficult and
65
emotional relocation disputes.1

V. NAVIGATING THE WATERS OF MASSACHUSETTS
RELOCATION LAW: THE COMPASS POINTS TO NECESSARY
REFORM
Massachusetts relocation jurisprudence is in need of reform. The
statute's failure to explicitly include children born out of wedlock or children removed to great distances intrastate supports the need for change to
more readily accommodate the new norms of a mobile society. Although
the real advantage standard clarifies the statute and offers the Massachusetts Family Law bar some guidance in litigating relocation cases, the application of the second prong of the standard proves subjective. The increased litigation of relocation issues over the last few years alone in
Massachusetts undoubtedly is indicative of the likelihood of frequent future
litigation over the hotly emotional and contested topic of child relocation.
Given the certainty of litigation over child relocation in the future, either
the statute should be amended to explicitly outline a standard, or perhaps
more realistically, the real advantage standard should be judicially abandoned in favor of a standard reflecting the appellate court's emphasis on
the custodial parent's interests, and more importantly, in favor of a standard
that offers guidance to both litigators and trial judges.
Massachusetts should again follow New Jersey, an apparent pioneer in relocation law, in abandoning the real advantage standard in favor
of a standard that, in practice, carries out the ideals implicit in the real advantage standard. The standard in New Jersey, focusing on whether the
move is inimical to the best interests of the child or the visitation rights of
the non-custodial parent, realigns the principles of the real advantage standard with the modem realization that placing a high burden on the custodial
parent who desires to move is not consistent with a mobile society, today's
parity between men and women, society's acceptance of cohabitation and
children born out of wedlock, and the existence of rising divorce rates.
Massachusetts would further resolve the problem of the standard's lack of
guidance by adopting factors to be applied in relocation cases, as New Jersey did in developing the twelve factors in the Baures case and as Massachusetts has done in the alimony and property division context. In develop-
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See id.; see also supra note 109 and accompanying text (noting that not every situation

will warrant consideration of every factor).
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ing a new standard, the Massachusetts Family Law bar could counsel their
clients more effectively as to the likely outcome of a court granting the relocation, trial judges could employ guided discretion in making findings as
to each factor more effectively, and appellate courts could give proper deference to trial courts' decisions.
Amie J. Tracia

